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CONTEMPORARY FIDUCIARY INVESTMENTS: WHY
MARYLAND NEEDS THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
David M. Tralinst
"And another came saying, 'Lord,
behold, here is thy pound which
I have kept laid up in a napkin...
[and He answered] wherefore thou
avest not thou money into the
ank that at my coming I might have
required my own with usury?' "t
The problem of how to invest the funds of another is not new.
While not intended as an investment guide, this article traces the
development of the law in the area offiduciary investment, ana-
lyzing the conflict inherent in balancing the considerations of
safety, yield and liquidity with the needs of the beneficiaries.
Concluding that most common law and statutory standards are
unduly restrictive in light of modern investment practices, the
author considers the Maryland experience and suggests that the
Maryland legislature adopt a prudent man rule which would
enable fiduciaries to effectively utilize contemporary investment
vehicles.
1. INTRODUCTION
The investment powers of fiduciaries' are usually specified in the
t B.A., University of Maryland, 1969; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law,
1973; Partner, Fisher and Winner, Baltimore, Maryland; Member, Baltimore Es-
tate Planning Council, International Association of Financial Planners; Member,
Maryland Bar, U.S. District Court Bar, U.S. Court of Appeals Bar, Supreme
Court Bar.
t Luke 19:20, 23. This quotation does not express the religious beliefs of the author
nor the University of Baltimore, but is merely an example of the very early recog-
nition of the issues embraced by the substance of this article. For a secular cita-
tion of this quotation see In re Eddy's Estate, 134 Misc. 112, 117, 235 N.Y.S. 455,
460 (1929).
1. The term fiduciary is derived from Roman law and describes "a person or institu-
tion who manages money or property for another and who must exercise a stan-
dard of care in such management activity imposed by law or contract." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 563 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Maryland law provides that a personal
representative of an estate is a fiduciary and may use the authority conferred on
him by the estates of decedents law, by the terms of the will, by court orders, and
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terms of the instruments providing for their appointment.' The testator
may, however, have died intestate or the instrument granting fiduciary
powers may be so inartfully drafted as to leave doubt about the type of
investments authorized.' In such situations statutory or common law
standards are applied, traditionally requiring preservation of the fund's
principal at the expense of income.4 These standards, however, have
proven unduly restrictive in light of modem investment practices which
emphasize productivity5 and do not provide fiduciaries with the flex-
ibility needed to adapt investments to changing economic conditions.
Judicial and legislative attempts to define fiduciary investment
powers have vacillated between imposing specific lists of sanctioned in-
vestments to applying prudent man negligence standards to those in-
vesting the funds of another. This article surveys the state of
investment authority today and analyzes the legal list variations and
the prudent man rule in terms of traditional investment considerations
such as safety, productivity, liquidity and beneficiary needs. The arti-
cle considers the interaction in Maryland between the common law
prudent man rule espoused by the courts and the legal lists adopted by
the legislature. The conclusion finds that legislative enactment of the
prudent man rule in Maryland would provide the necessary balance
between cautious, yet flexible, investment decisions.
by equitable principles applicable to fiduciaries. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 7-101(a) (1974); accord N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 11-2.2(b)(2) (McKinney
1967 & Supp. 1982). The term personal representative includes "executor."
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201, 8 U.L.A. 309 (1972). An "executor" is a person
appointed, either expressly or implicitly, by a testator to carry out directions con-
cerning dispositions made in a will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (rev. 5th ed.
1979). If a decedent dies testate, a personal representative may designate himself
as an "executor" or if the decedent dies intestate as an "administrator." MD. EST.
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(y) (1974).
The general rules applicable to the conduct of fiduciaries apply to personal
representatives, trustees and executors. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 15-
101(e) (1974). But cf. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 15-102 (1974 & Supp.
1982) (powers of fiduciaries to act without approval of the court in Maryland are
not applicable to personal representatives or executors).
2. The investment rules discussed herein are applicable only when the instrument
(ie., will, deed or trust) fails to adequately describe the particular types of invest-
ments the fiduciary is permitted to make. See, e.g., In re Jannella's Will, 33 Misc.
2d 64, 224 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1962).
3. Cf. In re Nuese's Estate, 25 N.J. Super. 406, 408, 411-12, 96 A.2d 298, 300-01
(1953)(trustee is under a duty to observe specific terms of a trust calling for a
particular investment), afl'd on other grounds, 15 N.J. 149, 104 A.2d 281 (1954).
4. See In re Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 A. 112 (1926).
5. See G.C. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 611 (rev. 2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; A.W. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 6 (3d ed. 1967) [here-
inafter cited as SCOTT]; Investments By Personal Representatives, Report of Com-
mittee on Investments by Fiduciaries, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 465 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 8 REAL PROP.].
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II. HISTORY OF INVESTMENT AUTHORITY AND POWERS
4. In General
A fiduciary's power to make investments may flow from the instru-
ment providing for his appointment, 6 the common law,7 statute,8 or or-
ders of the court.9 The primary source of the investment power is the
instrument naming the fiduciary, for it is within that instrument that a
testator may expand or limit the fiduciary's powers.' 0 There are nu-
merous forms available to the draftsman providing language sufficient
to give a fiduciary broad powers of investment." Power clauses are
usually broadly drafted because of the potential dangers of using re-
strictive language when granting investment powers. A narrowly
drawn instrument limits the fiduciary's ability to minimize substantial
losses due to changing economic conditions.' 2 But it must be noted
that while hardship on the beneficiary of an estate has been cited as a
reason for adopting statutes authorizing broad powers, such powers
may not be exercised contrary to express provisions in the instrument. 13
If the language of an instrument does not provide a safe harbor for
the fiduciary, i.e., contains no express investment directives, the court
examines other rules in order to determine whether the fiduciary's in-
vestment decisions were made within the limits of his powers. These
rules take various forms and can best be understood by an examination
of their historical development.
Fiduciaries have since their inception been subject to a rule of pru-
dence, a fact recognized by English courts as early as 1820.1' English
courts initially limited fiduciary investments to government or bank an-
nuities.'" English statutory provisions subsequently enlarged approved
6. See, e.g., MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-101(a) (1974).
7. Id A fiduciary "shall use the authority conferred upon him by the estates of
decedents law .... and by the equitable principles generally applicable to
fiduciaries .. " Id," see, e.g., Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, 505-06, 119 A. 256,
259 (1922) (there being no direction from testator other than "good, safe" invest-
ments, trustee need only act as a prudent man investing his own money).
8. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-101(a) (1974).
9. Id,'see also id § 7-402(a). The court's only discretion is, by the process of ratifica-
tion, to approve or disapprove of a fiduciary's management decisions. Johnson v.
Webster, 168 Md. 568, 578, 179 A. 831, 835 (1935) (trustee); Zimmerman v. Cob-
lentz, 170 Md. 468, 474, 185 A. 342, 345 (1936) (executor).
10. See, e.g., 7 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS pt. 1, at 121-22
(1980-8 1) (forms § 62-218, § 62-219).
11. See 8 AM. JUR. LEG. FORMS 2d § 104:114-:115 (1972).
12. See In re Nuese's Estate, 25 N.J. Super. 406, 411-12, 96 A.2d 298, 300-01 (1953)
(trustee held not accountable for loss when specific provision of will limited in-
vestments to those that in reasonable judgment of trustee would produce annual
income between 512% to 7%), aff'd on other grounds, 15 N.J. 149, 104 A.2d 281
(1954).
13. See Act of March 3, 1976, ch. 337, 1976 N.J. Laws 1342 (introductory statement).
14. See Massey v. Banner, 1 Jac. & Will. 241, 37 Eng. Rep. 367 (1820).
15. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 613.
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investments to include real property securities 6 and government
consols. 17
It appears that early authorities in the United States construed the
English law as limiting fiduciary investments to government or real
property securities;' 8 however, the early American courts had difficulty
applying the English law due to the dearth of equivalent investment
vehicles in the United States.' 9 The question necessarily arose as to
whether more flexibility should be allowed American fiduciaries be-
cause of the lack of investment opportunities.
The judicial response came in Harvard College v. Amory,2" de-
cided in 1830. Proceeding on the assumption that the capital over
which any fiduciary has control is always at risk,2' the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts focused on the conduct of the fiduciary
rather than on the performance of his investments.22 By defining what
is known as the prudent man rule,23 the court freed American
fiduciaries from the strictures of English investment laws and provided
them with greater flexibility in investment decisions. This liberal view
was at first adopted by only a few jurisdictions. 24
In determining whether an American fiduciary has acted impru-
dently, courts invoking the prudent man rule have applied a negligence
16. See id., see also King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 83 (1869). A real property security is
defined as "[t~he security of mortgages or other liens or encumbrances upon land."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
17. See Fleming, Prudent Investments.- The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fleming]. The term "con-
sols" is an abbreviated form of the phrase "consolidated annuities" and represents
"British government stock established in 1751 by consolidating various govern-
ment securities and paying 21h% interest (originally 3%)." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 314 (1960).
18. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 613.
19. Fleming, supra note 17, at 243.
20. 26 Mass. 446 (1830).
21. Id at 461.
22. Id See Fleming, supra note 17, at 244.
23. The rule as stated by the court is:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest is, that he shall conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition
of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be invested.
Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830). The prudent man rule is
sometimes referred to as the Massachusetts rule.
24. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rulefor Fiduciary Investment in the
United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 496 (1950) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Shattuck]; see, e.g., McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); Peckham v.
Newton, 15 R.I. 321, 4 A. 758 (1886); Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 A. 1014
(1908). For another discussion of the developments of the rule from the point of
view of durational requirements, see Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J.
547, 550-51 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
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test.2 5 This test presumes an obligation to obtain at least a minimal
rate of return on the principal in the hands of the fiduciary.26 In defin-
ing this obligation two factors are considered: (1) the length of time the
funds are held by the fiduciary; and (2) the amount of the funds being
held.27 If the factors indicate that a deposit in an interest-bearing ac-
count should have been made and was not, a surcharge can be imposed
against the fiduciary"' in an amount equivalent to the interest currently
offered by the savings institutions in the community.29
Nearly forty years after Harvard College, the prudent man rule
was reexamined by the New York Court of Appeals in King v. Talbot3
and was found lacking. The New York court ruled that fiduciaries
must place a greater emphasis on safety in selecting investments and,
therefore, they should utilize government bonds and mortgages as in-
vestments rather than stocks.3" This decision, setting forth court-sanc-
tioned investments, subsequently led a number of jurisdictions to pass
legislation limiting investments to those appearing on legal lists. 32
The legal list legislation began in 188933 when the New York legis-
25. E.g., Ing v. Baltimore Ass'n, 21 Md. 427 (1864); Fitchard v. Hirschberg's Estate,
128 Or. 317, 272 P. 906 (1928).
26. See Ing v. Baltimore Ass'n, 21 Md. 427 (1864); In re Girard's Estate, 152 N.Y.S.2d
981 (1956). One could reasonably argue that, today, a fiduciary must do more
than obtain a minimal return to meet his obligation under the prudent man stan-
dard. New investment vehicles can safely provide more substantial returns, there-
fore a fiduciary must also consider the amount and regularity of income and
weigh the potential income against safety when selecting investments. See infra
note 120. See generally AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 227 (1967);
Annot., 117 A.L.R. 871 (1938). The minimal investment return requirement is
also meaningless unless economic conditions existing at the time of the investment
are considered. See Young v. Phillips, 170 Tenn. 169, 93 S.W.2d 634 (1936).
27. See In re Girard's Estate, 152 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (1956).
28. In addition, a surcharge can be imposed against a fiduciary when he is guilty of
self-dealing, Irwin v. Keokuk Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 218 Iowa 477, 255 N.W. 671
(1934), or when he has failed to comply with a court order, In re Marker's Estate,
137 Ohio 89, 27 N.E.2d 1019 (1940).
29. See In re Girard's Estate, 152 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1956). See generaly 33 C.J.S. Execu-
tors andAdministrators § 187 (1942 & Supp. 1982).
30. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). See also Friedman, supra note 24, at 556 for a discussion of
this case.
31. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 89-90 (1869). The theory has been advanced that the
thinking of the Court of Appeals of New York was influenced by a post Civil War
depression. See generally Barclay, Why the Prudent Man Rule? 99 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 127, 128 (1960).
32. Two states retain legal lists today. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 74; N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 60-05-10 (1975), 6-05-15 (Supp. 1982), 6-05-15.1, 6-11-08 (1975).
33. See Fleming, supra note 17, at 244. The banking industry appears to have played
a significant role in the formulation of legislation affecting investments by
fiduciaries. See Friedman, supra note 24, at 563. The legal lists were very similar
to savings banks lists which existed in nearly every jurisdiction, including Massa-
chusetts, except that legal lists were prepared by the legislature or by the executive
branches of government. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 499. Savings banks main-
tained lists of appropriate investments, even in prudent man jurisdictions. Id
One could assume that such lists existed for the guidance of the industry and/or
provided some measure of protection from criticism of the industry as a whole in
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lature passed a statute authorizing fiduciaries to invest in bonds and
mortgages, as the King court had suggested twenty years earlier.34
During the next decade, a fiduciary in a legal list jurisdiction had be-
come a conservator similar to the English fiduciary of the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries35 whose duty was to protect the
rights of the remainderman at the expense of life tenants.36
The theory reflected in the legal list legislation was that benefi-
ciaries were entitled to protection from the inexperienced or ignorant
trustee.37 To this end, government and municipal obligations and high
quality bonds and notes appeared most frequently and consistently on
the lists,38 while equity participations 39 were almost universally ex-
cluded. ° By 1900 those jurisdictions adhering to the Massachusetts
prudent man rule were in the minority, with the majority following the
New York legal list rule.4
In the late 1930's and early 1940's, a shift occurred in the economic
standing of the population. The trust became the tool of the middle
class as well as of the rich.42 From June 1926 through June 1938, the
Comptroller of the Treasury reported a 921% increase in the assets of
savings institutions and a 466% increase in the number of trusts in
existence.43 The use of life insurance trusts also became common.'
While this period was marked by an increase in both the number
of trusts and the size of their assets, the securities eligible for inclusion
making investments. The latter theory is supported by the MODEL PRUDENT
MAN INVESTMENT ACT, written by the American Bankers Association in 1942,
and adopted by the New York State Bankers Association in 1950. See infra note
51. The action of the banking industry in attempting to legislate investment stan-
dards indicates a desire to memorialize a presumption of correctness in invest-
ment decisions and to legitimize such decisions in the corporate fiduciary field.
34. Act of March 14, 1889, ch. 65, 1889 N.Y. Laws 63 (repealed 1897). In 1970, how-
ever, New York adopted a "prudent investor" rule for trustees, personal repre-
sentatives and guardians. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2 (McKinney
Supp. 1982).
35. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 495.
36. Id Of course, a remainderman would be more interested in the safety of the
principal, whereas a life tenant would prefer increased production of income.
37. Id at 499.
38. Id
39. Equity participation is akin to having equity in real estate, ie., receiving or having
a part or share of the value of a property above the total liens or charges against it.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The term is often used to refer
to corporate stock.
40. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 499.
41. Id The majority included the principal economic states of the country-Califor-
nia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and the entire block of North-
west Territory jurisdictions. Id It is also noteworthy that, as the western states
had not yet fully developed their economies, the early decisions predominately
reflected the economic conditions prevalent in the eastern jurisdictions. See
Friedman, supra note 24, at 562-63.
42. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 499.
43. Id at 500.
44. Id
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on legal lists declined.45 In addition, the income earning power of se-
curities on the lists started to decline while overall prices began to
rise.' These two factors, coupled with general economic conditions
resulting from the stock market crash, placed the income of the life
tenant of an estate in a most precarious position.47
Investment conditions were not as difficult in the prudent man rule
states as in the legal list jurisdictions since the flexibility afforded by the
prudent man rule enabled fiduciaries to invest in equity participations
and strengthen estate portfolios.48 Indeed, while the rate of return on
an investment in the legal list jurisdictions was approximately 2%, a 4%
rate of return could be obtained in a prudent man rule jurisdiction with
relative ease.49
The economic facts of life quickly became apparent to corporate
fiduciaries and state legislators, and the number of legal list jurisdic-
tions began to decline. 0 In 1942 the American Bankers Association
drafted the Model Prudent Man Investment Act, applicable to all
fiduciaries.5 ' The Association concluded that the language of Harvard
College v. Amory52 was appropriate and used its definition of the pru-
dent man rule in drafting the Model Act.53
In 1950 New York, responding to pressures from the New York
State Bankers Association, adopted a partial prudent man rule.5 4 This
was a significant change for the leading legal list jurisdiction, but the
departure was not total since under the new law the investment in
45. This was because the country had recently experienced the stock market crash of
1929. Fleming, supra note 17, at 245.
46. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 500.
47. Id
48. Id at 501.
49. Id
50. Fleming, supra note 17, at 491. See supra note 32 for the two legal list jurisdic-
tions remaining.
51. The MODEL PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT AcT provides in pertinent part:
In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and
managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall exercise
the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income
as well as the probable safety of their capital.
Trust Div. Am. Bankers Ass'n, Model Prudent Man Investment Act, TRUST & EST.
LEGIS. 7 (1961 & Supp. 1969) (out of print). It is curious to note that while the
MODEL PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT ACT is cited by numerous authorities, the
text of the Act is no longer available in published form. See also BOGERT, supra
note 5, § 612 n. 18. For a discussion of the role of the banking industry in the area
of fiduciary investment legislation, see supra note 33.
52. 26 Mass. 446 (1830)
53. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 612. Compare the language insupra note 23 with that in
supra note 51.
54. Note, Trust Fund Investment in New York: The Prudent Man Rule and Diversifica-
tion of Investments, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 527, 531 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Trust
Fund Investment].
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"nonlegals" could constitute only a percentage of the total assets of the
portfolio. 5
B. Investment Authority Today
At present, investment rules for fiduciaries fall into four broad cat-
egories: (1) the prudent man rule initiated by judicial decisions;56 (2)
the prudent man rule adopted by statute;57 (3) statutory legal lists, both
mandatory58 and permissive; 9 and (4) hybrid standards which limit
particular types of investments to a percentage of the total assets of the
fiduciary estate.6" Maryland law clearly serves as an example that
these categories are not mutually exclusive-the state has adopted the
prudent man rule by judicial decision but also uses permissive and
mandatory legal lists.6 In fact, it is quite difficult to categorize the
kind of standard applicable in many jurisdictions due to the interplay
between the common law and statutes which apply to different kinds of
55. Id In 1970, New York adopted a statutory prudent investor rule. N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUST LAW § 11-2.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982). Most hybrid jurisdic-
tions, i.e., those jurisdictions authorizing a percentage of investments in "nonle-
gals," require that the "nonlegal" investment meet stringent standards such as
high ratings by investment services, excellent earnings and dividend records, and
ratings in particular stock exchanges. Today, codes of hybrid jurisdictions in-
clude: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564:18 (1974), 391:la (1968); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2109.37-.37.1 (Page 1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6-1 to -5 (1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 881.01 (West 1982).
56. See, e.g., McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31, 70
N.E. 1031 (1904); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321, 4 A. 758 (1886).
57. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-302 (1971); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2261 (West Supp.
1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-304 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1531 (Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE § 68-502 (1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 5 (1972); IND.
CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-3(c) (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.123 (West
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5004 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:21-27
(West 1964 & Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-13-3 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 24-601 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.050 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-16
(1978); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 36 A-2 (Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 161 (West 1971);
OR. REV. STAT. § 128.057 (1981); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302 (1975); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-11-10 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 55-5-1 (1980);
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-46 (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 33-2-1 (1953 & Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.24.020 (1961); Wyo.
STAT. § 2-3-301 (1980).
58. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 74 (investment in stocks and bonds of private corpo-
rations not permitted); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-05-10 (1975), 6-05-15 (Supp.
1982), 6-05-15.1, 6-11-08 (1975) (permits limited discretionary investments by
trust companies but restricts other fiduciaries to legal lists); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 564:18 (1974), 391:la (1968) (permits limited discretionary investments by trust
companies but restricts other fiduciaries to legal lists).
59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2109.37 -.37.1 (Page 1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6-1 to -
5 (1982).
60. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 881.01 (West 1982).
61. See McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§§ 15-106, 13-805(b) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
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fiduciaries. 62
1. Judicial Prudent Man Rule
The application of the prudent man rule by judicial decision has
been carried forward to the present day. In Chase v. Pevear63 the full
range of considerations under the prudent man rule came into play and
the case is illustrative of a modem court's analysis of fiduciary invest-
ment performance.
In Chase seven specific investments were challenged, four of which
were in the housing industry and amounted to less than 4% of the trust
assets.' The guardian ad litem argued that an investment in a real
estate investment trust (REIT) was improper because it was "a new
concept invited by an Internal Revenue Code provision 65 which had
not survived adequate financial testing. 6 6 However, since the master
found that the REIT was a large and strong fund widely held by insti-
tutional investors and common trust funds, the propriety of the invest-
ment was upheld.67
In reviewing the investments made by the trustee, the court set
forth the rationale for retaining the prudent man standard: "[it] avoids
the inflexibility of definite classification of securities, it disregards the
optimism of the promoter, and eschews the exuberance of the specula-
tor. It holds fast to common sense and depends on practical experi-
ence."68 Although the modem rule rejects categorization of improper
investments,69 the court noted that a disproportionate part of a trust
fund should not be invested in a single kind of stock or bond.70 The
prudent man rule was also found to reject wasteful, hazardous or im-
properly speculative investments.7' Although the court would apply
the standard to each separate investment in deciding if a trustee is
chargeable with any loss, some consideration is given to the manage-
62. Shattuck, supra note 24, at 502. See generally BOGERT, supra note 5, at §§ 612,
616-67 (state by state discussion).
63. 419 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1981)
64. Id The estate of the testator consisted of "excessively diversified" common stocks
and ten bond issues, debentures and notes. From January 7, 1971 to May 1974,
the average annual rate of return on the securities in the trust was 3.5%. At the
end of 1974, it was 5.1%. Id at 1362.
65. REITs first came into being in 1961 as a result of a 1960 amendment to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954. I.R.C. §§ 856-58. The legislation attempted to create
a vehicle that would allow small shareholders to invest in a diversified portfolio of
real estate.
66. Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 (Mass. 1981). The reference to REITs as
being a new concept refers to the lack of seasoning for this investment vehicle. Cf.
Eby Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 371, 387 (Pa. 1977) (performance of REITs docu-
mented).
67. Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1981).
68. Id at 1365.
69. Id
70. Id at 1366.
71. Id
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ment of the fund as a whole since individual investment decisions may
be affected by performance considerations of the aggregate fund. The
focus should remain, however, on the individual security."2
The Chase court went on to rule that the purchase of common
stock in a business primarily engaged in insuring lenders against losses
in residential mortgage loans was proper despite the stock's subsequent
decline.73 However, the fiduciary was surcharged for failure to sell the
declining stock at an earlier date in light of "disquieting" informa-
tion.74 As to other challenges, the court found in each case that the
investments were widely employed in the investment community and
reflected certain favorable investment factors. These factors included
ratings, dividend performance and price performance.75
2. Statutory Prudent Man Rule
The vitality of the prudent man standard has been exhibited by its
legislative enactment, almost verbatim, nearly a century and a quarter
after its promulgation.76 Indeed, most state adoptions of the prudent
man rule have been by statutory enactment rather than by judicial de-
cisions.7 7 These statutes take several forms but frequently parrot the
language of the court opinions. 8
Some uniform acts or federal statutes, however, are deviations
from the broad standards of the state prudent man judicial decisions
which mandate that a fiduciary act as though he were dealing with his
own property. 79 The provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),8°
72. Id.
73. Id at 1368.
74. Id
75. Id. at 1368-69.
76. Such an example is the language of Utah's statutory provision. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 33-2-1 (1953 & Supp. 1982). The law applies to executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees and other fiduciaries. Law of 1977, ch. 194, § 70, 1977 Laws of
Utah.
77. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
78. Compare Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830) (a fiduciary is to
"observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own
affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the
capital to be invested") with CAL. CIV. CODE § 2261 (West Supp. 1982) (trustee
should "exercise the judgment and care, . . . which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of their capital"); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 33-2-1 (1953 & Supp. 1982).
79. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
80. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 281-592 (1972 & Supp. 1982). The UPC has been
adopted in its entirety by 14 states: ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.005.100 (1972 & Supp.
1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to -7307 (Supp. 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.005 to
735.302 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-101 to :8-102
(1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -7-307 (1979 & Supp. 1982);
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for example, invoke an external standard and require the fiduciary to
act as though he were dealing with the property of another s.8  To some,
the distinction between the UPC and the judicially created prudent
man standard may mean that a fiduciary under the UPC is permitted
broader latitude in investment decisions because the property under his
control is not his own. Perhaps a more intellectually honest interpreta-
tion, however, is that greater care is to be taken when dealing with
another's property and, consequently, the fiduciary's options are actu-
ally more limited.
The UPC distinguishes between the investment powers of a per-
sonal representative 2 and those of a trustee,8 3 and even a brief compar-
ison reveals radically different approaches to investment authority
between these two types of fiduciaries. The UPC sets forth a legal list
for personal representatives but also grants them power to invest in
those instruments which are "prudent" and "reasonable for use by
trustees generally. '84 Trustees, on the other hand, are authorized to
invest in those vehicles which "a prudent man dealing with the prop-
erty of another" would choose.85
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 1-101 to 8-401 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.1-993 (1980 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (West
1975 & Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to -5-502 (1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (1979 & Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to
-7-401 (1978 & Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1976 &
Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -80-101 (Supp. 1982). The UPC
applies to affairs of decedents, missing, protected, and incapacitated persons and
minors. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(b), 8 U.L.A. 302 (1972).
81. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-302, 8 U.L.A. 584 (1972).
82. Compare MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(c) (1974) (personal representa-
tive is authorized to "deposit funds for the account of the estate, including money
received from the sale of assets, in checking accounts, in insured interest-bearing
accounts, and in short-term loan arrangements which may be reasonable for use
by a trustee") with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715(5), 8 U.L.A. 448 (1972) (per-
sonal representative is authorized to "invest in federally insured interest bearing
accounts, readily marketable secured loan arrangements or other prudent invest-
ments which would be reasonable for use by trustees generally").
83. "Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee shall observe
the standards in dealing with. . . the property of another, and if the trustee has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or
expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-302, 8
U.L.A. 584 (1972).
84. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715(5), 8 U.L.A. 448 (1972).
85. Id § 7-302, 8 U.L.A. at 584. The deviation of the UPC from the judicially created
prudent man standard has not escaped comment. There appears to be little ra-
tionale behind the approach of the UPC in combining both a legal list and a
prudent man rule in its standards for personal representatives yet allowing trust-
ees to only be governed by a prudent man rule. One might speculate that, having
made the dichotomy, the draftsmen of the UPC were attempting to render the
standards for both offices harmonious. See generally Fleming, supra note 17, at
246.
The argument could easily be made that there is no greater protection af-
forded than the protection given to one's own assets. There is a point, however,
when even the most prudent man will decide that, while his assets are not abso-
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)86
codifies a standard for judging the investment performance of a fiduci-
ary that is a further deviation from the judicially created "prudent
man" standard. An ERISA fiduciary must exercise the judgment
which a prudent man "acting in a like capacity. . . would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. .. .
However, ERISA mandates that the fiduciary discharge his obligations
"in accordance with documents and instruments governing the plan
[only] insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
[other ERISAI provisions."88
3. Legal Lists
The jurisdictions which have adopted the legal list approach may
be classified as either mandatory or permissive.89 A traditional
mandatory legal list exists under New Hampshire law which states that
"unless it is otherwise provided by the instrument creating the trust, [a
fiduciary] shall invest the assets of the trust in the following described
classes of property only. . ,."9 Alabama's constitution prohibits in-
vestment by fiduciaries in bonds or stocks of any private corporation,
and further prohibits the legislature from enacting statutes authorizing
such investments.9' This particular provision has been described as a
"reverse legal list" specifying a "no" rather than a "yes."92 It is impor-
tant to bear in mind that even the use of the mandatory list presupposes
the exercise of prudence.93
Alabama supplements its constitutional "reverse legal list" with
a permissive range of categories, raising a presumption that such in-
vestments will be approved by reviewing courts.94 The permissive lists
allow fiduciaries to purchase other nonlist investments if ordinary skill
and prudence is used, an action precluded by the language of
lutely safe, they are sufficiently safe to permit some risk in order to yield a higher
return.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980, Supp. V 1981) (duties of fiduciaries to
assets of employee benefit plan held in trust); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.125 (West 1946).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1976).
88. Id (D).
89. See 8 REAL PROP., supra note 5, at 466; see also Friedman, supra note 24, at 567.
90. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:18 (1974).
91. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 74. Contra WYO. CONST. art. III, § 38 (grants legislature
the power to authorize investments in bonds, stocks or securities). Although Wyo-
ming originally followed the lead of Alabama, those constitutional enactments
have been attributed to "herd" instincts on the part of Wyoming's legislature.
Friedman, supra note 24, at 563.
92. Friedman, supra note 24, at 563.
93. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 614.
94. Alabama authorizes investment in certain classes of securities which are federally
or state insured or secured by promissory notes or mortgages. Life, endowment or
annuity contracts are also acceptable. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 3-120, 3-125 (1977).
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mandatory lists. 95
4. Hybrid Standards
The difficulty in categorizing the investment standards applicable
in many jurisdictions is most pronounced in states which maintain per-
missive legal lists or have enacted a statutory rule of prudence but con-
tinue to exert authority over the amount of funds to be placed "at risk."
For example, Ohio and West Virginia retain statutory legal lists
which are permissive but limit the percentage of investments sanc-
tioned in certain categories.96 The ultimate hybrid jurisdiction is Wis-
consin which enacted the prudent man standard but limited investment
in common stocks to 50% of the total market value of the fund.97 The
Wisconsin provision does, however, allow proceeds from the sale of the
excess stock to be reinvested in new common stocks.
III. TRADITIONAL INVESTMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Along with the common law duty to make a safe yet productive
investment, the modem fiduciary must also juggle changing market
conditions and the estate's need for readily available funds. As such,
the currently used investment standards must be examined to deter-
mine if, and to what extent, they satisfy these traditional investment
considerations.
A. Safety
Probably the greatest dilemma facing fiduciaries in their invest-
ment decisions is the conflict between safety of investments and the rate
of return they generate. By the nature of the office, a fiduciary may not
make an investment which is unsafe.98 He is also, however, charged
with a duty to make the funds entrusted to him productive.99 Because
he would be liable for any losses incurred as a result of the investment,
a fiduciary often looks first to its safety"° with only secondary consid-
eration going to the rate of return and the duration of the commit-
ment.' 0 ' The duty to make funds productive, therefore, often conflicts
with the fiduciary's self-protective instincts.
For many years, the investment opportunities available to fidu-
95. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 614.
96. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2109.37 - .37.1 (Page 1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6-1 to -
5 (1982).
97. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 881.01(2) (West 1982).
98. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 614.
99. 8 REAL PROP., supra note 5, at 465. See generally 3 C.J.S. Executors & Administra-
tors § 187 (1942 & Supp. 1982).
100. See, e.g., King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869); In re Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135
A. 112 (1926).
101. See, e.g., Ing v. Baltimore Ass'n, 21 Md. 427 (1864); In re Girard's Estate, 152
N.Y.S.2d 981 (1956).
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ciaries were limited to bank or savings and loan deposits because of the
traditional view that this was the safest way to make funds productive.
This was unfortunate for the estate since interest paid on such deposits
was usually very low, and higher rates of return could have been ob-
tained without sacrificing the safety of the principal.° 2
Bank and savings and loan deposits insured by one or more quasi-
governmental agencies 10 3 have recently been criticized, however, for
their alleged lack of safety. In recent months, the safety and security of
approximately one-third of the savings and loan associations across the
nation 1°4 have been threatened by high interest rates.' The assets in-
volved amount to approximately two hundred billion dollars. 0 6 For
102. Today, for example, the maximum rate of interest banks can pay on unrestricted
deposits is limited by law to 5/% on savings deposits in commercial banks and
512% on deposits in mutual savings banks. 12 C.F.R. § 1204.112 (1982). Maxi-
mum interest on time deposits ranges from 51/4% on funds committed for 14 days
to 73% on funds committed for eight years or more. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(b) (1982).
In comparison, as of June 27, 1982, Donoghue's Money Fund seven-day average
was paying 13% interest. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1982, at 14, col. 3. Rates on
money funds have declined significantly since that time.
Congress has enacted a provision to phase out the maximum rate of interest
and dividends on deposits and accounts as quickly as economic conditions war-
rant and to provide depositors with a market rate of return on savings with due
regard to the safety and soundness of depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501,
3503(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
Recently enacted legislation would allow savings and loans to create optional
accounts patterned after the money market account discussed infra in notes 132-
39 and accompanying text. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1501. There are arguments both for and
against the proposition that the legislation will enable the savings and loan indus-
try to perform competitively with the money funds. Although these optional ac-
counts have an advantage over money funds in that they are insured by the FDIC,
see infra note 103 and accompanying text, institutions often require large mini-
mum deposits and impose limitations on check writing. Savings and loans paying
a higher rate of interest on money-market type accounts will have to generate
these additional funds, most likely by raising the interest rates charged on con-
sumer, commercial and residential loans. If savings institutions receive a large
influx of depositors opting for this new account, they run the risk of being unable
to meet their obligations should interest rates return to their previously high
levels. For a critique of these new accounts see Rankin, Bank Money Funds-Still
A Good Idea?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, at FII, col. 1.
103. Eg., Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC), 12 U.S.C. 1725 (1976);
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), 12 U.S.C. 1811 (1976); Maryland Sav-
ings Share Insurance Corp. (MSSIC), MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-105 (1980).
Quasi-governmental agency obligations are backed by their own revenues.
104. Wall. St. J., May 27, 1982, at 10, col. 2.
105. Evening Sun, July 15, 1981, at B4, col. 2.
106. Id If interest rates had continued at their recently high levels, it is estimated that
savings and loan institutions would have been reduced to zero net worth at the
rate of one per day, with potential losses of 45 billion dollars. See id During the
period between February 1981 and July 15, 1981, the list maintained by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board of savings and loan institutions with substantial
financial difficulties rose dramatically. The number of troubled institutions on the
roster had risen to 404 before the Board abolished the list, rather than release such
information to the inquiring press. The Maryland Savings Share Insurance Cor-
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example, in March 1982, savings industry leaders requested a form of
federal subsidy that would cost the government seven and one-half bil-
lion dollars in the first year alone.' 7 While the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Company (FSLIC), which assists troubled financial in-
stitutions by providing capital infusions,'0 8 has assured depositors that
assets appear to be more than sufficient to cover any potential loss,'"
financial analysts and commentators report that investors have become
increasingly wary of the safety factor in insured accounts." 0
The crux of the problem involves the amount of capital held in
reserve out of which depositors are paid for losses by the insurers."'
Although the United States Senate and House of Representatives have
resolved that the full faith and credit of the federal government extends
to insure all deposits up to the prescribed limits," 2 no public law has
been signed by the President to this effect. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment has not been put to the test in light of the Congressional reso-
lution. Some analysts have also criticized the federal insurance funds
for taking on assets of questionable quality in distress merger situa-
tions, thereby making the integrity of the reserve fund even more
dubious. ' 13
poration (MSSIC) has taken the same position. Evening Sun, Nov. 21, 1981 at 67,
col. 2. The FDIC "problem list" numbers 425 banks. Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1983,
at 2, col. 2.
107. How Safe Are Your Savings NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 50, 54. Total assets
involved in federal savings and loan bailouts have risen from slightly more than
half a billion in 1979 to 11.6 billion in 1981. "Dr. Doom" Calling, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 15, 1982, at 55.
108. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725-26 (1976). Although the FSLIC is prepared to insure deposi-
tors from loss within its authorized limits of $100,000 per account, it has more
often chosen to find merger partners to take over the ailing institutions. In 1981,
these mergers totaled 294, with 23 of the mergers requiring cash from the FSLIC.
How Safe Are Your Savings, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 50, 52.
109. How Safe Are Your Savings, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 50.
110. See Scheibler, Call in the Reserves, BARRONS, Mar. 8, 1982, at 48; see also Money
and Credit, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 23, 1982, at 44.
Ill. Financial analysts estimated that the FDIC had roughly a 12 billion dollar reserve
at the end of 1981, equivalent to only 1.19% of the bank deposits it insures.
Scheibler, Call in the Reserves, BARRONS, Mar. 8, 1982, at 48. The FSLIC re-
serve is approximately six and one-half billion dollars. Money and Credit, Busi-
NESS WEEK, Nov. 23, 1982, at 44, 45.
112. H.R.J. Res. 290, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H957-58 (daily ed. Mar.
18, 1982), S2617-18 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982). The Resolution has not received
widespread attention perhaps, incredibly, due to the argument that too much reas-
surance may be a dangerous thing. This implies that depositors do, indeed, have
cause for concern over the sanctity of the insurance reserves. Underlying this
theory is the presumption by depositors that the insurance extended beyond the
prescribed limits. This was clearly rebutted by federal regulators' actions in the
takeover of Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City in the summer of 1982. The
RunawayAction in Deposit Insurance, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at 113.
113. Scheibler, Call in the Reserves, BARRONS, Mar. 8, 1982 at 48. This article pro-
vides an amusing insight into some of the assets obtained.
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B. Productivity
The rate of return on an investment goes to the heart of the duty to
make the funds in the hands of a fiduciary productive. This duty has
been underscored in recent years by the presence of high inflation and
high interest rates which tend to diminish the value of assets due to the
weakened purchasing power of the dollar. Further, it has never been
clear precisely how productive such funds must be, or what standards
are used to gauge a fair investment return."I
While the fiduciary's duty to invest funds in order to make them
productive is deeply rooted in the common law,115 it is not absolute.
There may be compelling circumstances, such as a mortgage foreclo-
sure or a medical emergency, which require the administrator to keep
the funds uninvested and available in order to meet the immediate
financial needs of a fiduciary estate." 6 Courts have noted that "an ex-
ecutor may be responsible for interest on money kept in his possession
• ..when there is no apparent reason or necessity for his doing so," 17
and likened such inaction on the part of the executor to "negligence
and a breach of trust."' 8 This negligence-type theory has been em-
braced by a number of jurisdictions either by common law or by stat-
ute." 9 Experience has shown that the most common means for a
fiduciary to avoid liability for failure to generate income has been to
deposit' 20 the funds into a governmentally-insured account yielding a
114. For example, the court in Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1981), noted
that a "fair" return during 1968 through 1974 would have been 3% to 6% with a
higher percentage towards the end of the period. Id at 1366.
115. See Ing v. Baltimore Ass'n, 21 Md. 427 (1864).
116. Mickle v. Cross, 10 Md. 352, 362-63 (1856). The court refers to unutilized funds
as laying "dead" in the hands of the administrator. Id
117. Id at 363 (emphasis in original).
118. Id; see also Cooper v. Jones, 78 A.D.2d 423, 435 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1981).
119. E.g., Douglas v. Westfall, 113 Cal. 2d 107, 248 P.2d 68 (1952); Crowell v. Styler,
315 Mass. 122, 49 N.E.2d 599 (1943); In re Baldwin's Estate, 311 Mich. 288, 18
N.W.2d (1945); In re Estate of Lare, 436 Pa. 1, 257 A.2d 556 (1969); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 462 (Smith-Hurd 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2109 (Page 1976).
120. The distinction between a deposit and an investment is not always clear. The
principal feature of a deposit is the bank's obligation to repay the amount depos-
ited on demand. However, when a deposit is made in a bank, a strong presump-
tion arises that the funds will be made productive because interest will be earned.
In re Kruger's Estate, 139 Misc. 907, 911-15, 249 N.Y.S. 772, 776-80 (1931) (citing
Van Wagoner v. Buckley, 148 A.D. 808, 811, 133 N.Y.S. 599, 601 (1912)). Thus a
deposit may also fall within the classic definition of an investment-using capital
to secure income. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
The case of In re Gershcow, 261 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 1977), demonstrates the
possible danger in obtaining a minimal rate of return. A remainderman of a tes-
tamentary trust sought the removal and surcharge of a trustee for holding the
funds in her hands in savings accounts at a rate of return approximating 5%. The
remainderman felt that public utility bonds yielding a rate of return of 8% to 10%
were a better selection. In rejecting the attempted removal and surcharge, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held the investments were proper. However, the
court's analysis in supporting the trustee was based on a number of factors unre-
lated to prudent investment analysis, such as the trustee's lack of compensation,
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relatively low interest rate.
Today, however, certain new investment vehicles' 2 1 can provide
both substantial return and considerable safety. These new investment
vehicles were created as a response to rapidly increasing inflation and
higher interest rates, the combined effect of which make low yielding
investment vehicles less attractive. The practice of placing funds in an
insured, interest-bearing account with a national bank or savings and
loan association without examining the use of new investment vehicles
has long since been abandoned by the average investor. 122
C. Duration
The durational commitment of any particular investment is also
an important consideration for the fiduciary in making investments. 23
The fiduciary must consider the cash needs of the estate and the mar-
ketability or liquidity of the investment vehicle. 124 Long term invest-
ments may provide a higher degree of safety or rate of return than
investments which may be short term and highly volatile. A fiduciary
may, however, be forced to meet a cash requirement which would ne-
cessitate liquidation of long term investments at a depressed value. Fi-
nally, a fiduciary should be able to respond to shifts in the bond market
due to economic pressures such as increases in the prime lending rate
and, more recently, actions of the Federal Reserve Board in driving
interest rates down. These changes make higher-yielding, long-term
debt instruments more attractive and valuable.
Depositors in banks or savings and loans elect safety at the ex-
pense of income, although funds in these institutions are readily avail-
able for withdrawal should a cash need arise. The fiduciary might
obtain more substantial return on insured deposits and still maintain
the flexibility required by diversifying purchases in United States
Treasury bills or other short term bank paper. 125
her relationship to the testator who was her sister, and the fact that only one of
three remaindermen objected. Id. at 339. The case is significant not for the fact
that the trustee was allowed to remain in office unscathed, but rather for the prop-
osition that while investments in certificates of deposit are not per se improper
trust investments, a court will seriously entertain an argument that they may be
under certain circumstances. It is submitted that absent the personal factors in-
volved the court's decision may have been different. See supra notes 26 and 102.
121. See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
122. See Exploring the Money-Fund Option, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 52.
123. In re Girard's Estate, 152 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1956); see Friedman, supra note 24.
124. See generally 8 REAL PROP., supra note 5, at 472.
125. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to determine the maturity of bonds,
not to exceed 20 years, and certificates, not to exceed 10 years from the date of
issue. 31 U.S.C. § 757b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Treasury bills have maturities of
less than one year and usually mature in 90 to 180 days. Treasury notes mature
within one to seven years. Treasury bonds have a maturity of seven years or
more. Investing in Government Securities, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 17, 1974, at 83,
84-85.
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D. The Beneficiary
A final investment consideration, although implicit in all other
factors, concerns the needs and desires of the people for whom the
fiduciary estate is maintained. Although the intent of the creator of the
fiduciary estate defines the parameters of safety, yield and duration,
these three factors are not absolutes and must be balanced with the
needs of the beneficiaries in determining the ideal blend of investments
to be maintained. Obviously, the investment intended to provide a sta-
ble source of monthly income will not provide the nest egg needed for a
college education. The investment standards adopted by a particular
jurisdiction have a pronounced effect on the fiduciary's ability to pro-
mote each of the factors with which he must be concerned. These dif-
fering standards will be analyzed to determine which is best suited to
achieve the ideal.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT STANDARDS IN LIGHT
OF TRADITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Legal Lists
A mandatory legal list, whether stated in the positive or negative,
has its highest and best use in protecting the fiduciary estate from the
inexperienced investor. Emphasis is placed on safety as exemplified by
the use of such vehicles as insured, interest-bearing accounts. While
the argument advanced for maintaining legal lists is that the principal
will be there when needed, the theory is myopic at best for the public
has outgrown the need for restrictive legal standards designed to pro-
tect beneficiaries from ignorant or inexperienced fiduciaries. In fact, it
is the investing public's demands which caused the professionalization
of certified financial planners, investment advisors, and money
managers.
The mandatory legal list approach usually results in a lower rate
of return than other investment standards. It may force a fiduciary to
make investments of extremely long duration in order to increase the
rate of return on the funds in his hands. As such, changes in the eco-
nomic climate cannot elicit quick response, nor can the needs of the
beneficiaries be accommodated promptly without risking loss to the
value of the funds. In addition, the whim of the legislature determines
what is a "legal" investment at any given time. Mandatory lists are so
restrictive that institutional investors, who normally favor strict stan-
dards, are often unable to prevent a diminution of the funds in their
hands.
The mandatory legal list is, fortunately, fading from the landscape
of fiduciary investment. 26 In its place one now finds a permissive legal
list which sets forth sanctioned categories of investment and allows, by
126. See supra note 32.
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implication, other "prudent" investments. 27
A superficial analysis would lead one to believe that the permissive
list is the best of all possibilities. After all the fiduciary benefits from
greater latitude in investment decisions and from the presumption that
investments in certain categories will be upheld by a court if chal-
lenged. The analysis breaks down, however, when one considers that
the legal list does not preclude a "prudence" analysis. In essence, all
types of legal lists, whether mandatory or permissive, become overlays
to a rule of prudence. It is also regrettable that permissive lists are
often treated as mandatory 28 and that fiduciaries such as financial in-
stitutions perceive adherence to the categories as insulation from liabil-
ity in making investments. A permissive list may add a presumption of
correctness or a legitimacy to an investment decision but it begs the
underlying question of whether or not, under all the circumstances, the
investment is a wise one.
B. The Prudent Man Rule
Under the prudent man rule a fiduciary may be completely flex-
ible in terms of duration, safety, and yield, tailoring investments to suit
varying needs in varying degrees. This has led to the development of
an "efficient portfolio" theory 129 in which the risk levels of investments
are balanced to provide a fair rate of return, utilizing investment vehi-
cles of recent vintage such as money market funds, repurchase agree-
ments and covered options trading. The chief criticism of the prudent
man rule is that this flexibility makes the rule too hard to administer. 130
It is difficult to evaluate the risks in using unseasoned investment vehi-
cles which may, for example, expose the fiduciary estate to the unin-
sured collapse of a large equity issue. While this may be true, it must
be noted that a similar analysis would also have to be made in a
mandatory or permissive legal list jurisdiction to evaluate the prudence
of the risk-income ratio.' 3 ' Although new investment alternatives are
constantly being promoted, and while many of them may indeed be too
untested to evaluate, the more seasoned vehicles mentioned previously
have proven to be sound.
127. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 613.
128. See Friedman, supra note 24, at 569.
129. An efficient portfolio "is one that contains a mixture of holdings such that it pro-
vides the largest expected return for a given level or risk." M.J. WHITEMAN & M.
SHUBIK, THE AGGRESSIVE CONSERVATOR INVESTOR 49-50 (1979). Due to the in-
creased institutionalization of the stock market over the past 20 years, securities
are driven to their fair market values, and thus investors cannot make above-
average profits unless they take above-average risks. For a criticism of the effi-
cient portfolio theory, see Goodman & Peavy, Responsible Investing: Optimizing
the Return/Risk Tradeoff, 21 TR. & EST. L.J. 12 (1982).
130. See Friedman, supra note 24, at 569.
131. BOGERT, supra note 5, § 614.
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1. Money Market Mutual Funds
The high inflation rates of the 1970's-80's, coupled with the restric-
tions on interest rates payable by traditional depository associations,
have resulted in a dramatic growth of money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) which provide investors with market yield rates and high
liquidity.' 32 Generally, these funds are organized as corporations or
business trusts by brokerage firms. "Shares" are sold to the public, rep-
resenting equity ownership of the funds. The proceeds are then in-
vested in high-yield, short-term money market instruments. The
returns on these investments, less management expenses, are distrib-
uted to shareholders as dividends. 33 A unique feature of MMMFs is
the constant net asset value per share. If there is a decrease in the value
of the investment, it is reflected in a decrease in the number of shares
in the holder's account.13  The value of the investor's interest in
MMMFs, therefore, fluctuates as the fund's portfolio rises or falls.
The higher potential returns of MMMFs are a function of the risks
involved. Unlike deposits at federally insured institutions, MMMFs
guarantee neither return of principal nor a fixed yield. As "open ended
investment companies," MMMFs are subject to the legal requirements
of the Investment Company Act of 1940,131 which requires disclosure
of pertinent information to potential investors by means of a prospec-
tus. However, fiduciaries and investors need to be aware that MMMFs
are not part of the highly regulated banking system and that the only
insurance generally carried by these business trusts is insurance against
embezzlement of principal.' The principal of a money fund may
otherwise be at risk when a loan is made by the fund to a company that
subsequently defaults or when the fund has selected instruments with
long maturities in a market with falling interest rates.' 37 This latter
scenario may generate a "run" on the assets of the fund when investors
132. The first money fund or money market fund was the Reserve Fund, which opened
in 1973. Investing for Income, MONEY, Oct. 1974, at 55, 62. These funds have
been widely heralded as providing opportunities to small investors which previ-
ously were unavailable to them.
133. See generally Adams, Money Market Mutual Funds: Has Glass-Stegall Been
Cracked?, 99 BANK L.J. 4 (1982).
134. Id. at 7, 14.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 80a(l) to (64) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The reference to "open ended
investment companies" appears at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1976).
136. Quinn, Is Your Money Safe NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981, at 74.
137. Id On August 25, 1981, the Honorable Harry J. McGuirk, Chairman of the
Maryland Senate's Economic Affairs Committee, held hearings on a bill that
would have required mutual funds receiving money from Maryland investors to
insure the funds' principal. In his remarks, the Chairman indicated that he
thought many individuals were unaware of the funds' lack of insurance. Repre-
sentatives of the money funds testified that they would be unable to issue shares in
Maryland if such legislation were passed due to the necessity of treating investors
from all states equally. Hearings on S. 1121 Before the Senate Economic Affairs
Comm., 1981 Md. Gen. Ass. (written testimony from 20 participants available
from the Committee's file).
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begin to liquidate their holdings in favor of other investments. The
fund would be unable to meet the demand for withdrawals without
liquidating assets at less than their value at maturity. 138 While these
safety considerations merit attention, it should be noted that from 1972
to 1982 there have been no losses to investors as a result of a money
market fund investment. 139 This record compares favorably to that of
insured savings and loan associations and banks in recent years.
2. Repurchase Agreements
Another uninsured, yet generally safe, investment vehicle is the
bank repurchase agreement, available to individual as well as institu-
tional investors, and sometimes referred to as "repos." These agree-
ments allow the investor to purchase securities from a member of the
Federal Reserve System or from a well established securities dealer,
with an agreement by the seller to later repurchase the securities at the
same price, plus interest at a specified rate."4 The repurchase agree-
ment represents a contractual arrangement between the bank or securi-
ties dealer and the investor and is not a deposit; consequently the
principal amount involved is not insured."'4 If the seller fails to repur-
chase, the investor may be paid the value of the underlying securities,
which could be below market, or be treated as an unsecured creditor in
subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. 42
These repurchase agreements allow investors to earn substantial
interest on a very short term basis, since maturities usually run for a
period of less than seven days. These agreements represent a high de-
gree of safety if the seller is a reputable institution and the maturities
are kept to a short period. 43
3. Covered Option Trading
Perhaps the optimal low risk method for a fiduciary to generate
income is to sell options on the stock held in the estate's portfolio. In
order to do so, the stock must be optionable, that is, of a kind traded
regularly on a national options exchange. 144 The fiduciary can then
instruct his broker to sell what is known as a "call," granting the buyer
an irrevocable right to purchase the security at a fixed price within a
stated period of time, as selected by the fiduciary. 145 Covered option
138. Exploring the Money-Fund Option, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 52; Wall St. J.,
Nov. 5, 1981, at 12, col. 2.
139. Evening Sun, Aug. 26, 1982, at C 11, col. 1.
140. Quinn, Is Your Money Safe, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981, at 74.
141. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
142. Quinn, Is Your Money Safe, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981 at 74.
143. Id
144. Most stock brokerage firms provide literature to investors desiring to engage in
options trading. A particularly helpful publication is the brochure Understanding
the Risks and Uses of Listed Options (American Stock Exchange, Oct. 1982).
145. S. GAYLORD, SENSIBLE SPECULATING WITH PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 24, 25
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trading can be used as a hedge against the decline in value of securities
since a premium has been paid for the option even if it is not exercised.
The very low risk associated with covered options trading makes it a
sensible choice for the cautious fiduciary. 146
As these examples indicate, jurisdictions adhering to the prudent
man standard seem best suited to promoting traditional investment
considerations. Admittedly, judicial administration becomes more sub-
jective without statutory guidelines, but perhaps no more so than in a
jurisdiction which fails to adopt a consistent investment standard. An
examination of the Maryland experience clearly shows that statutory
enactment of the prudent man rule is the best approach to fiduciary
investments.
V. THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE
A. The Common Law
In 1884, Maryland chose to follow the Massachusetts prudent man
rule, 147 and in 1897 a judicious investment was defined by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland as one "a prudent man would [have made] in the
management of his own affairs."'' 48 In 1922, the standard was again
emphasized in Fox v. Harris,149 exonerating testamentary trustees from
a charge of recklessly and improvidently investing the assets of an es-
tate resulting in a heavy loss. ' 5 The court of appeals indicated that the
test of proper fiduciary investing in Maryland was whether the trustees
acted as ordinary prudent men would act in investing their own funds.
In holding that the trustees had met the test then existing in Maryland,
the court looked to factors such as the quality of the outside advice they
had used in making their investment decisions, whether the trustees
had invested their personal funds in the same securities, and whether
they had made any personal profit out of these transactions.' 5 ' By
1936, Maryland case law had consistently confirmed the earlier adop-
tion of the prudent man rule. 152
(1976). Of course, if the fiduciary determines that the stock should remain in the
portfolio the option should be repurchased. Id
146. See id at 96; see also Foulke & Tollefsen, Running a Pilot Program for Options,
115 TR. & EST. 30 (1976); Levy, Weighing the Options, 114 TR. & EST. 806 (1975).
147. See McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884).
148. Gilbert v. Kolb, 85 Md. 627, 634, 37 A. 423, 424 (1897).
149. 141 Md. 495, 119 A. 256 (1922).
150. Id. at 506, 119 A. at 260.
151. Id. at 504, 119 A. at 259.
152. Shipley v. Crouse, 279 Md. 613, 621-22 (1977); Goldsborough v. Dewitt, 171 Md.
225, 258 (1936). Note, however, that at the same time the Maryland courts were
establishing the prudent man rule, the legislature pursued a different course. For
example, in 1831 the General Assembly empowered the Orphans' Court to order
the guardian of a minor's estate to invest funds received by him, and further em-
powered the court to direct the manner and form in which funds were deposited.
Act of March 14, 1832, ch. 315, § 5, 1831 Md. Laws. Without authorization of the
Orphans' Court a deposit made by a guardian established him, in effect, a guaran-
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B. The Statutory Law
In contrast to the constancy of the courts, Maryland statutes
impose a crazy-quilt pattern of standards for investment by fiduciaries.
While Maryland common law generally favors the prudent man
rule, 153 a permissive legal list of investments lawful for "any person"
appears in the Maryland code.' 5 4 Separate standards, some of them
mandatory, exist for personal representatives,' 55 guardians, 56 custodi-
ans, '57 and trustees. 58 Numerous other provisions exist throughout the
code authorizing investments by the Workmen's Compensation
Fund,'59 by savings banks,'6 ° and by savings and loan associations. ' 6'
tor of the deposit. Fay v. Fay, 172 Md. 570, 580, 193 A. 674, 681 (1937) (Parke, J.,
dissenting); see also Friedman, supra note 24, at 559. In Fay, it was recognized
that a court may ratify a deposit by a guardian if the court knew the deposit was
made but had not ordered the funds into court. Clearly, then, guardians were not
governed by the prudent man rule since the court could approve the guardian's
actions only under the rationale of ratification. In response to judicial unease
with this state of the law, in 1969 the Maryland legislature eliminated the role of
the Orphans' Court with respect to funds of an estate. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 7-401 (1974).
153. See, e.g., Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, 119 A. 256 (1922); Gilbert v. Kolb, 85 Md.
627, 634, 37 A. 423, 424 (1897); McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884). See gener-
ally BOGERT, supra note 5, § 636; Shattuck, supra note 24, at 502.
154. The Maryland legislature has specified that the following investments are lawful
for any person to make: (1) debentures issued by federal intermediate credit
banks or by banks for cooperatives; (2) bonds issued by federal land banks, or by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; (3) mortgages, bonds or notes secured by a
mortgage deed of trust or debentures issued by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion; (4) obligations of National Mortgage Associations; (5) shares, free-share ac-
counts, certificates of deposit, or investment certificates of any insured financial
institution; (6) bonds or other obligations issued by a public housing authority;
and (7) obligations issued or guaranteed by the international banks for reconstruc-
tion and development. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 15-106 (1974 & Supp.
1982).
155. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(e),(n),(s) (1974) (personal representatives
may invest in insured, interest-bearing accounts or short-term loan arrangements
(which may be reasonable for use by a trustee), sell, purchase or otherwise deal
with property, and continue business ventures in which the decedent was engaged
at the time of his death).
156. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-213 (1974) (powers of fiduciaries applicable
to guardians): cf. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-805(b) (1974 & Supp.
1982) (guardian of veteran may invest, without a court order, only in interest-
bearing obligations of the State or United States or in savings and loan accounts
or other obligations guaranteed by the federal government).
157. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-304(e) (1974) ("the custodian, notwithstand-
ing statutes restricting investments by fiduciaries, shall invest and reinvest the cus-
todial property as would a prudent man of discretion and intelligence who is
seeking a reasonable income and the preservation of his capital...").
158. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 15-1020) (1974) (trustee may invest in insured,
interest-bearing accounts or in short-term loan arrangements).
159. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 80(a), (b) (1979) (treasurer of State Accident Fund
may invest in funds legal for investment by fire, casualty and miscellaneous insur-
ance companies, subject to all provisions of law respecting the deposit of other
state funds).
160. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 4-206(3)(i), (6) (1980) (savings bank may invest de-
posits "on good security" and may invest in real property).
161. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 9-419 (1980) (savings and loans may invest, for
Investments of public funds also receive individual treatment in the
Maryland code.' 62 The code provisions not only fail to provide consis-
tent standards for fiduciaries, but also fail to fit any of the model statu-
tory schemes. 163
The discrepancy between the common law in Maryland and the
legislative enactments argues strongly for statutory adoption of the pru-
dent man rule. The Maryland legislature has interposed what can be
characterized as a permissive legal list for most fiduciaries; it has ac-
knowledged, however, that the prudent man rule underlies all fiduciary
investment decisions."6 One is then left to wonder why Maryland's
legal lists are necessary. Perhaps the mandatory list serves some func-
tion in that it cuts off any further inquiry into whether an investment
not appearing on the list has been prudent. However, those invest-
ments enumerated on the list are still subject to analysis under the pru-
dent man standard. The only advantage of the mandatory list is that it
serves to narrow the inquiry and thereby promotes judicial efficiency
by creating a presumption of correctness in an investment selection.
The permissive list analysis flows along the same lines in that the
investments enumerated are still subject to an examination of pru-
dence. However, because permissive lists allow broader latitude in de-
cision making they lose whatever advantage they may have in
promoting judicial efficiency. Permissive lists possess a certain cynical
quality about them, i.e., they come to be viewed as mandatory or they
promote in the fiduciary a false sense of security about his investment
example, in specified mortgages, loans, ground rents, real property and securities).
162. E.g., MD. ANN CODE art. 31, § 6 (1976) (financial officer of political subdivision
may invest sinking funds in specified bonds); MD. ANN. CODE art. 31, § 24(b)
(Supp. 1982) (municipal corporations may invest proceeds of refunding bonds in
obligations guaranteed by the federal government); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95,
§§ 22, 22A-E (1979 & Supp. 1982) (county finance directors and treasurer of state
may invest in obligations guaranteed by the federal government or in local gov-
ernment investment pool).
163. For example, compare MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(e) (1974) (per-
sonal representative may deposit funds in interest-bearing accounts or in short-
term loan arrangements "which may be reasonable for use by a trustee") with
Trust Div. Am. Bankers Ass'n, Model Prudent Man Investment Act, TRUST & EST.
LEGIS 7 (1961 & Supp. 1969) (out of print) (fiduciary shall exercise the judgment
and care under the circumstances then prevailing which men of prudence, discre-
tion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs). But com-
pare MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 14-202(a)(3) (1974) (trustee to administer
funds in manner which men of ordinary prudence would manage their own af-
fairs) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959) (trustee's invest-
ments governed by the terms of the trust, otherwise limited to such investments as
a prudent man would make with his own property, subject to statutes governing
investments by trustees). One might speculate that the legislature, in enacting the
various Code provisions, merely chose to deal with defining the investment pow-
ers of fiduciaries on a piecemeal basis without being aware of the judicial deci-
sions in the areas of fiduciary conduct.
164. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 15-106(c) (1974).
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decision. Moreover, the list, by its nature, tends to stagnate so that it
does not keep pace with a changing investment scenario. By way of
example, one can compare New York's provision for use of money
market fund investments 65 with the Maryland statutes, which are com-
pletely silent as to their use. It is unclear whether this is to be taken to
mean that the Maryland legislature views money fund investments as
improper. However, in light of their widespread use such a conclusion
is doubtful.
In essence, Maryland's statutory provisions on investments by
fiduciaries generate much heat but little light. The fiduciary is on his
own in making decisions, frequently operating under the belief that the
law protects him when, in fact, it only creates a presumption in favor of
his decisions if he complies with the statutory recommendations.
It would seem the better course to allow fiduciaries complete lati-
tude in the selection of their investments, without statutes which serve
as a constraint on their decision making. However, such an approach is
not without risks. Failing to guide an inexperienced fiduciary, or elimi-
nating the presumption of correctness which attaches to legal lists, may
increase the use of judicial resources to settle claims of imprudent
investments.
It is submitted that this drawback does not outweigh a full em-
brace of the prudent man rule. The advantages are many. Inexper-
ienced fiduciaries who do not seek advice in the conduct of their office
are declining in number, while experienced fiduciaries would better
their performance if not constrained by legal lists. Fiduciaries serving
under inartfully drawn instruments or intestate appointment will be
placed on an equal footing with those who are granted broad powers
under properly drawn documents. Institutions may be made more re-
sponsive to the beneficiaries they serve, and in turn may be able to
generate greater revenue through their fiduciary services. Since the un-
derlying question, even where legal lists exist, is always the prudence of
a particular investment, it is doubtful if adoption of the rule would
foster a serious increase in litigation concerning the propriety of an
investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the prudent man rule has been a part of the history of
fiduciary investment for many years, to a large extent legislatures have
blurred its primacy by imposing mandatory or permissive lists of
proper investments. The investing public has become more sophisti-
cated, thus outgrowing the original need for paternal legislative protec-
tion. Accordingly, over the years legislative pronouncements on proper
fiduciary investments have been relaxed, perhaps tacitly acknowledg-
ing the legislature's inability to impose standards in a vacuum when
165. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2(b) 1, 2 (McKinney 1967).
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the ultimate question remains the prudence of a particular investment.
Even the most knowledgeable legislators are unable to respond quickly
enough to the everchanging shifts in the investment atmosphere, or
to predict the performance of as yet unproven investment vehicles.
Clearly then, there is nothing to be gained from imposing investment
standards on the fiduciary decision making process, and much to be
lost in terms of the traditional considerations of safety, yield, liquidity
and beneficiary needs.
Maryland's crazy-quilt pattern of legal lists is clearly inconsistent
with the common law rule of prudence espoused by the Maryland
courts. Maryland should return to its judicial roots and adopt the pru-
dent man standard by legislative enactment. Since the Maryland
fiduciary is in reality given no legislative guidance in his difficult task
of juggling conflicting considerations, a statutory prudent man rule
would, at the very least, allow the fiduciary to utilize modern invest-
ment vehicles.
